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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
surer was classified as a tort and the one-year prescription was
applied. It was pointed out that while the wife had a cause of
action against her husband, she did not have a right of action
against him; however, since this inability to sue her husband
did not obstruct her right to sue the insurer, there was nothing
to interfere with the running of prescription against this claim.
A keenly debated issue was presented in National Sur. Corp.
v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. 27 as to whether a suit by the employer's
compensation insurer against the alleged third party tortfeasor
also interrupted the prescription with respect to the claim of
the injured employee. The court of appeal held that there was
no interruption because the nature and extent of the employee's
demand was quite different from the insurer's claim, so that
the defendant in a suit on the latter claim could not be deemed
thereby to have been notified of the former. In reversing, the
Supreme Court maintained that both demands affected the same
cause of action,2 8 and held that prescription against the em-
ployee's claim had been interrupted by the insurer's suit, in
which the employee had intervened. Both positions have sub-
stantial merit; from the point of view of social policy, and con-
sidering that the one-year prescription is rather short in such
cases, the Supreme Court's ruling comes closer to fulfilling the
social need.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL SERVITUDES
Joint Lease Extension
The decision in Armour v. Smith1 sheds further light on the
rules regarding joint lease extension of mineral servitude inter-
ests. Plaintiff's vendor had created a mineral servitude in favor
of himself by reservation in 1939. In 1946, plaintiff and her
vendor entered into a lease on a standard printed form for a
27. 247 La. 905, 175 So. 2d 263 (1965), reversing 168 So. 2d 858 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1964).
28. LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 247 La. 122, 170 So. 2d 347 (1964).
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primary term of ten years. A special provison was, however,
added, stating that if production occurred under the lease fifty
per cent of the royalty should go to plaintiff and fifty per cent
to her vendor. Subsequently, plaintiff's vendor sold a part of
his mineral rights to defendants subject to the outstanding lease.
Other instruments having some bearing on the outcome of the
case were executed subsequent to the joint lease; however, the
focal issue was whether the lease in question was a joint lease
for a term running beyond the prescriptive date of the outstand-
ing mineral servitude and was so intended by the parties, re-
sulting in an extension of the mineral servitude created in 1939.
The Supreme Court followed prior jurisprudence in this area2
in deciding that as the lease was a joint lease and was intended
to be such by the signatory parties, the life of the mineral servi-
tude was extended by execution of its lease. This decision serves
to clear up some doubt which had crept into the jurisprudence
regarding the intent factor necessary to work an extension of
mineral servitude rights by execution of a joint lease. Language
in the earlier decision in Elkins v. Roseberrys might have been
construed as requiring that there be an express intent to so
extend outstanding mineral rights. However, the court adhered
to the previously established intent factor - i.e., that the parties
must have intentionally executed a joint lease for a term running
beyond the prescriptive date of the outstanding mineral rights.4
Thus, the technique of reasoning by inference from entry into
the joint lease appears firmly imbedded in the jurisprudence.
The court reasoned that plaintiff landowner could not grant a
valid mineral lease covering all of the mineral rights without
joinder of her vendor. Thus, it could be inferred from her ac-
ceptance of the advantages of receiving bonus, rentals, and par-
ticipation in royalties, that she intended that the outstanding
mineral interest be extended as a result of her entry into the
joint lease.
In a vigorous dissenting opinion,5 one Justice relied on the
language in Elkins v. Roseberry,6 referred to above as support-
ing the proposition that the intent to extend an outstanding
2. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 69 So. 2d 21 (1953) ; Baker v.
Wilder, 204 La. 759, 16 So. 2d 346 (1943) ; Achee v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313, 1
So. 2d 530 (1941) ; Adam v. Johnson, 133 So. 2d 175 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
3. 233 La. 59, 96 So. 2d 41 (1957).
4. See the authorities cited in note 2 supra.
5. Armoar v. Smith, 247 La. 122, 170 So. 2d 347, 350 (1964).
6. 233 l.a. 59, 96 So. 2d 41 (1957).
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mineral interest as the result of execution of the joint lease must
be express. 7 The presence of his dissent and his reliance on the
language from the Elkins case serve to underline the meaning
of this decision insofar as it affirms the principle that the in-
tent to extend need not be express. The intent factor important
in these cases is the intent to enter into a joint lease for a term
running beyond the prescriptive date of outstanding mineral
rights. The intent to extend outstanding mineral rights is in-
ferred from the circumstances of the transaction.
Criticism may be levelled at the joint lease extension con-
cept on the ground that any intent to prolong the life of the
mineral servitude should be express." Louisiana courts have
gone to great lengths in requiring that the intent to interrupt
by acknowledgment be express 9 and that it meet elaborate
formal requirements.1" In defense of the Armour decision it
has already been noted that it is consistent with prior juris-
prudence.11 However, it is curious to observe that by executing
a joint lease for a primary term of ten years, as in this case,
the life of a mineral servitude may be prolonged for the same
period which would result from an interruption by acknowledge-
ment, a legal effect which can be wrought only by express intent
and obedience to intricate formal rules.
Use
Two cases decided during the past term turned on the ques-
tion whether admitted uses inured to the benefit of all property
subjected to mineral servitudes by a single conveyance. In Spier
v. Barnhill 2 a mineral lessee sought to rescind a previously ob-
tained lease and to recover the bonus paid on the ground that
the lessor, who had expressly warranted title to the mineral
rights in question, was in breach of his warranty. The original
servitude tract was a large body of land across which a public
7. The confusion as to the appropriate intent factor probably results from a
failure to distinguish the joint lease extension cases from the cases involving
acknowledgments proper. In the case of acknowledgments, it is clear that the
intent to acknowledge must be express. E.g., James v. Noble, 214 La. 196, 36
So. 2d 722 (1948). See Donohoe, Acknowledgments, Joint Leases and Prescrip-
tion, liTIE INST. ON MINERAL LAW, 82, 104 (1964).
8. E.g., James v. Noble, 214 La. 196, 36 So. 2d 722 (1948).
9. Ibid.
10. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Thompson, 222 La. 868, 64 So. 2d 202
(1953) ; Roberts v. Cooper, 127 So. 2d 369 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
11. See the authorities cited in note 2 supra.
12. 168 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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road had been constructed prior to creation of the mineral servi-
tude in 1927. Production was obtained from one portion of the
premises in 1933. The critical issue was whether prescription
had been interrupted as to that portion of the original tract
lying beyond the public road. On the facts, it was held that the
road was a public parish road tacitly dedicated under R.S.
48:49113 and that the public had acquired only a servitude rather
than full ownership of the roadway. 1 4 Thus, in accordance with
prior jurisprudence, 15 it was held that the presence of the road
did not divide the original tract into two servitudes, and the
production obtained in 1933, which had continued to the present
time, constituted an interruption of prescription as to the en-
tirety of the original tract. Plaintiff's demands were rejected.
In Gunby v. Commercial Solvents Corp.16 mineral rights were
sold on three contiguous tracts of land. At the time the servitude
was created one-fourth of the mineral rights were outstanding
on one of the three tracts. Additionally, a well was producing
on a second of the three tracts. The landowner contended that
the conveyance had not created a single servitude, urging that
as no development had taken place on the third tract the mineral
rights had prescribed. The court properly held that the convey-
ance created a single servitude as the three contiguous tracts
formed one large, continuous body of land.17 The presence of
the producing well served to interrupt prescription as to the
entirety of the servitude.
In Webb v. Carlton'" plaintiffs, nonresidents, were asserting
the nullity of a judgment of 1961 declaring mineral rights in-
herited by them from a nonresident to have been extinguished
by prescription. The nullity of the judgment appeared clearly to
13. LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950) : "All roads . . . in this state that are opened, laid
out or appointed by virtue of any act of the l.egislature or by virtue of an order
of any parish governing authority in any parish, . . . or which have been or are
hereafter kept up, maintained or worked for a period of three years by authority
of any parish governing authority in its parish. . . . shall be public roads ...
Also all roads . . . made on the front of their respective tracts of land by in-
dividuals when the lands have their front on any of the rivers or bayous within
this state shall be public roads."
14. Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp., 205 La. 988, 18 So. 2d 591 (1944).
15. Hunter Co. v. Ulrich, 200 La. 536, 8 So. 2d 531 (1942). Compare Calhoun
v. Ardis, 174 La. 420, 141 So. 15 (1932).
16. 170 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
17. Lenard v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 265, 29 So. 2d 844 (1947). Compare
L e v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923).
18. 165 So. 2d 54 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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the court,19 and it was also apparent that the mineral rights had
been used continuously from 1940 to the date of the suit. The
only noteworthy point in the decision is the court's reference to
the production maintaining the mineral rights as being "pro-
duction in paying quantities." If seriously intended as stating
a legal requirement, it should be observed that this language is
squarely contrary to the holding of the Supreme Court in Mays
v. Hansbro,20 in which it was stated that whether production is
in paying quantities is of no import as long as there is some
production or use of the servitude.
MINERAL LEASES
Conceptual Nature
The decision rendered by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
in Succession of Simms21 may become one of the more significant
in Louisiana's mineral jurisprudence. However, as it is still
pending before the Supreme Court of Louisiana, no extended
comment on the merits of the case is appropriate. The pertinence
of this case to the mineral law field lies particularly in the ap-
pellate court's resolution of the issue whether certain overriding
royalty interests involved in the litigation were to be char-
acterized as movable or immovable for purposes of descent and
distribution and, therefore, choice of law as between Texas and
Louisiana. Taking note of the existing confusion of statutes and
jurisprudence, the court observed a very strong legislative policy
favoring characterization of mineral leases as real rights. It
further recognized that "the State of Louisiana, in order to
maintain the integrity of its public records system, should not
be forced to look, in either its sovereign or proprietary capacity,
to the laws, decisions, or proceedings of another state in order to
determine the ownership or possession of its own mineral
rights.' ' 22 Thus motivated, the court concluded "that for the
purpose of characterizing succession property . . . in the area
of conflicts of law, overriding royalties and other interests in
mineral leases are incorporeal immovables, so that the validity
19. Plaintiffs were the heirs of a former owner of the mineral servitude who
had resided and died in Texas. The judgment in favor of defendants was granted
subsequent to the death of the former owner. Plaintiffs were never given any
notice of the action in any fashion.
20. 222 La. 957, 64 So.2d 232 (1953).
21. Succession of Simms, 175 So. 2d 113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), writ8
granted, 247 La. 878, 175 So. 2d 111 (1965).
22. Id. at 126.
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of foreign testamentary dispositions of such property located in
this state definitely must be determined by the law of the state
of Louisiana." 2
3
On original hearing before the Supreme Court, the case was
disposed of on an exception filed in that court. However, a re-
hearing has been granted and the matter is still under considera-
tion.
Damages
In Jones v. Whittington24 it appeared that plaintiff and de-
fendant entered into a letter agreement looking toward a trans-
action involving partial assignment of an interest which plain-
tiff was to obtain under a prospective "farm-out" agreement.
In the letter agreement between plaintiff and defendant, the
latter expressly agreed to comply with the drilling requirements
of the farm-out to be obtained by plaintiff. Under the provisions
of the farm-out plaintiff was required to drill a well on each of
two tracts subject to the agreement. Defendant drilled the first
of the two wells, which was plugged and abandoned as a dry
hole, but refused to commence the second. Plaintiff filed suit
seeking damages measured by the cost of drilling the second
well.
Under the farm-out agreement plaintiff could not sublease
or assign his interest without written consent of his assignor
(or sublessor). Defendant filed an exception of no cause or
right of action based on the contention that plaintiff had not
obtained the required written consent and thus had neither right
nor capacity to contract with defendant respecting an obligation
to assign the leases on the properties involved. The court of
appeal reversed the lower court, which had sustained the excep-
tion, for numerous reasons. It was observed that defendant was
not a party to the farm-out agreement, that defendant clearly
accepted the drilling requirements in question, that defendant
and his attorney were fully informed of the drilling require-
ments before operations were commenced, that defendant had
never demanded an assignment under the letter agreement, that
there was no evidence indicating that plaintiff's assignor (or
sublessor) would have refused to grant its consent, and that
plaintiff was not seeking specific performance but only damages.
23. Ibid.
24. 171 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
1966]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The court further noted that it would be "most inequitable to
permit one who has breached a contract to assert his own viola-
tion as a defense on the ground that the other party might be
unable to perform his obligation which would become due at
some future time.' '25
Turning to the question of damages, it was argued that plain-
tiff had no right to recover as he had failed to place defendant
in default as required by the Civil Code.26 The court termed
defendant's failure and refusal to perform an active breach of
contract and held as a consequence that no putting in default
was necessary. While this holding may be subject to some ques-
tion, the result is sound as the breach of contract in question
was not a mere failure to perform an obligation of which de-
fendant was unaware but was a deliberate refusal to perform,
which would have made any default notice a vain act.27 Plaintiff
would thus have been relieved of any necessity for default.2s
Defendant further argued that the drilling of the second
well would have been a useless undertaking inasmuch as the
possibility of production had been geologically condemned by
the drilling of two dry holes in the immediate vicinity of the
property. The court stated that even if the validity of this con-
tention were conceded, it would be of no significance as defend-
ant's obligation was unconditional. Further, benefit to plaintiff
was found in the fact that performance of the drilling obligation
assumed by the defendant would have served plaintiff to the
extent of establishing his good faith performance of the condi-
tion imposed by the farm-out agreement, even if the well had
been unproductive.
Defendant's last contention was that the cost of drilling the
second well was not a proper measure of damages. The propriety
of this measure of damages was, however, upheld. This holding
is consonant with prior jurisprudence.29 However, in reaching
its decision the appellate court found it necessary to distinguish
cases, such as Fogle v. Feazel,30 involving failure by a mineral
25. Id. at 766.
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1912 (1870).
27. Wadkins v. Wilson Oil Corp., 199 La. 656, 6 So. 2d 720 (1942).
28. Ibid.
29. Fite v. Miller, 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939) ; Fite v. Miller, 196 La.
876, 200 So. 285 (1941).
30. 201 La. 899, 10 So. 2d 695 (1942). Defendant also cited and relied on
Godfrey v. Lowery, 223 La. 163, 65 So. 2d 124 (1953) and Clement v. Sneed
Bros., 240 La. 48, 121 So. 2d 235 (1960).
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lessee to drill a well under penalty of forfeiture of the lease.
The latter cases were distinguished on the ground that the par-
ties had provided forfeiture as the penalty for failure to drill
a well, whereas in the case at bar and similar prior cases3' there
was an unconditional obligation to drill a well. This distinction
is sound and is firmly based in the jurisprudence.
East v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp.3 2 involved interpreta-
tion of the provisions of a mineral lease relating to incidental
uses of the lease premises. The lease in question gave lessee the
right to "construct, maintain, and use roads, pipelines and/or
canals thereon for operations hereunder or in connection with
similar operations on adjoining lands." Defendant lessee had
removed dirt from the leased premises to use in construction
of a road in connection with operations on an adjoining lease.
Plaintiff contended that he was entitled to damages for removal
of the dirt in question as the lease did not authorize removal
of the dirt for construction of a road on adjoining property. It
was held that surface use, to be authorized, must be ordinary,
customary, reasonable, and necessary in connection with opera-
tions on the leased premises. 33 Further, the court did not con-
sider it within the intent of the parties that dirt could be re-
moved from the leased premises to construct a road in connection
with operations on adjoining property.
Finally, the appropriate measure of damages was hotly dis-
puted. Plaintiff contended that damages should be gauged by
either the cost of restoring the property to its original condition
or the value of the fill dirt which was removed from the leased
premises. 34 Defendant urged that it was responsible to plaintiffs
only for: (1) the value of the right taken;35 or (2) the value of
that part of the surface of the land which was utilized ;36 or (3)
31. See the authorities cited in note 29 supra.
32. 168 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
33. See Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1958).
34. Plaintiffs relied on the following cases: Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Scully,
71 F. 2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934) Aleman v. Sewerage & Water Board of N. 0., 196
La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940) Juncker v. T. L. James Co., 148 So. 2d 795 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Hebert v. T. L. James & Co., 72 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1954); Kotteman Furniture Co. v. McClellan, 2 So. 2d 485 (La. App. Or].
Cir. 1941).
35. Relying on Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So. 2d 457
(1948), which involved geophysical trespass.
36. Relying on Greenberg v. New Orleans Public Services. Inc., 74 So. 2d 771




the value in place of the materials excavated ;37 or (4) the dif-
ference between the market value of the plaintiffs' land before
the road fill was excavated and its value after completion of the
construction work.38 The court adhered to the principle that no
rigid rule can be made for the measurement of damages in cases
of this kind; rather the measure best suited to determination of
the loss in each case should be adopted.3 9 Further, it was ob-
served that much discretion must be left to the trial judge or
jury in matters of this kind. Therefore, in view of the circum-
stances presented, the court felt unable to say that the trial
judge erred in concluding that the measure of damages should
be the value of the dirt removed. Expenses incurred in removing
the dirt were held properly considered in determining the true
market value of the soil which was removed. Judgment was
affirmed awarding the value of the dirt less the expenses which
would have been incurred in making it available to a prospective
purchaser.
Parol Evidence
McRoberts v. Hayes,40 decided by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal, reaffirms the rule of Hayes v. Mueller41 prohibiting
parol proof of partnerships for the acquisition of mineral leases
or other mineral interests. Of particular note in this case is that
the petition alleged that stock in a corporation formed by one
of the alleged partners to hold a particular lease was a partner-
ship asset subject to an accounting as prayed for by plaintiff.
Plaintiff contended that his petition did not allege or seek to
prove ownership of immovables by parol evidence but merely
sought an accounting, including the stock, which was an incor-
poreal movable. An exception of no cause of action was sus-
37. Relying on DeHart v. Continental Land & Fur Co., 205 La. 569, 17 So. 2d
827 (1944), a case involving removal of shells in which damages were measured
by the value of the shells in their natural state.
38. Relying on McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 184 La. 1.01, 165 So. 632
(1936), which held that a landowner might have a cause of action for wasteful
dissipation of gas by defendant's negligence, damages to be measured by impair-
ment to the market value of land.
39. In stating this principle the court relied on 15 Am. Jur. Damages, § 107
(1938). The court further stated that in the assessment of damages in cases in-
volving offenses and quasi offenses much discretion must be left to the trial judge
or jury, citing LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1934 (1870), Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1941), and Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La.
684, 35 So. 2d 457 (1948).
40. 173 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1955), writs granted, 247 La. 1023, 175
So. 2d 303. Since the original writing of this piece the Supreme Court has sus-
tained the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 181 So. 2d 390 (La. 1966).
41. 245 La. 356, 158 So. 2d 191 (1963).
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tained on the ground that the fundamental purpose of the part-
nership was to engage in the promotion of various endeavors in
connection with production of minerals, including acquisition of
mineral leases, and therefore parol evidence was inadmissible.
As the petition disclosed that the partnership was verbal, it was
insufficient. The rule of Hayes v. Mueller 42 is subject to criti-
cism, 43 but this decision seems in harmony with it, though ap-
plied to a new factual situation and a new alleged asset, cor-
porate stock.
Royalties
Three cases decided during the past term shed light on the
problem of when a failure to commence payment of royalties
will be deemed cause for cancellation of a lease. Prior decisions
of the Louisiana Supreme Court and courts of appeal have estab-
lished the principle that a lessee is guilty of an active breach
of contract warranting cancellation of a mineral lease without
default notice if lessee has delayed commencement of royalty
payments for an appreciable length of time without justifica-
tion.44 Two of the recent decisions refused cancellation, 4 while
the third granted cancellation.
46
In Broadhead v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp.47 there was
a lapse of some eight months between discovery of oil on plain-
tiff's property and the date on which plaintiff filed suit seeking
cancellation. Shortly before plaintiff commenced the suit divi-
sion orders were circulated by defendant preparatory to be-
ginning payment of royalties. Two facts appear to have been of
crucial significance to the court. First, the discovery well was
in wildcat territory, and there was necessarily some delay in
securing a market and constructing marketing facilities - i.e.,
a pipeline to the nearest outlet. Second, there were some forty
royalty owners entitled to participate in production royalties,
and in the court's judgment there was a substantial amount of
curative work to be done preparatory to commencing payment
of royalties. In this regard it also appeared that plaintiff had
42. Ibid.
43. See Note, 25 LA. L. REv. 277 (1964).
44. Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Bailey
v. Meadows, 130 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
45. Harris v. Trahan Drilling Contractor, Inc., 168 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1964); Broadhead v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 166 So. 2d 329 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964).
46. Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
47. 166 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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been requested to cooperate in the curative work, had indicated
willingness to be of help, but had not furnished the promised aid.
Under the prior cases, it does seem that eight months might
be termed an appreciable length of time.18 However, the circum-
stances of the case were sufficient to support the argument that
the delay, though appreciable, was justified. Having reached
this conclusion, the court characterized the failure to pay as a
passive breach of the lease contract. Thus, as no notice of default
was given by plaintiff prior to the demand for cancellation, it
was held that plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy demanded.
The facts of Harris v. Trahan Drilling Contractor, Inc.49 are
difficult to unravel. They are, nevertheless, a source of some
amusement, as the two parties appear to have fallen into dispute
from entrenched positions, attempted simultaneous flanking
maneuvers, and wound up in a pitched court battle with each
firing from the other's original fortifications. For reasons un-
important to this discussion plaintiffs initially contended that
defendant's lease had terminated for failure to conduct opera-
tions within sixty days after the drilling of a dry hole. Defend-
ants took the contrary position. After an extended exchange of
correspondence covering a period of almost a year, defendants
executed a release forwarded to plaintiffs with a letter explain-
ing that, notwithstanding execution of the release, plaintiffs
would be held for their pro rata share of the cost of drilling the
one productive unit well serving a portion of plaintiffs' property.
This release was treated by plaintiffs as conditional and there-
fore unacceptable. At this point, plaintiffs apparently changed
their position and decided to deposit checks for production roy-
alties which had been previously tendered by defendants. How-
ever, defendants stopped payment on the production royalty
checks.
Ultimately, plaintiffs filed suit seeking cancellation for
failure to pay royalties. Defendants answered, denying the
breach alleged and reconvened seeking to have the tendered
release recognized and enforced and to obtain from plaintiffs
an accounting for drilling and operating costs, arguing that
48. For example, in Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co., 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962), the delay involved was 7 months. Compare Fawvor v. United
States Oil of t.a., Inc., 162 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) in which though
the delay was apparently appreciable (eight months), the court found it justified
under the circumstances.
49. 168 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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plaintiffs were estopped to deny the validity of the release as
they had contended that the lease expired for failure to conduct
operations or obtain production within sixty days of cessation
of operations.
The reconventional demand was denied on the ground that
the release was not one which plaintiffs were bound to accept
as it was conditional. On consideration of the plaintiffs' main
demand for cancellation for failure to pay royalties and defend-
ants' argument that they were not guilty of the alleged breach,
the court held that there was no failure to pay on the part of
defendants for any appreciable length of time without justifica-
tion. They had actually attempted to fulfill their obligations
respecting payment of royalties by tendering the checks refused
and later deposited by plaintiffs. It was, in fact, plaintiffs' re-
fusal to accept the royalties which caused the delay involved.
Thus, plaintiffs were in no position to complain that the lease
should be cancelled, as it was their initial contention that the
lease had terminated and their refusal of royalties which oc-
casioned the delay.
The third case in this area is Sellers v. Continental Oil Co.50
Plaintiffs originally granted a lease on a tract of approximately
121 acres. As a result of releases, the area under lease was
reduced to two noncontiguous tracts, each of which was included
in a separate conservation unit. Plaintiffs were paid all royalties
to which they were entitled as a result of production from one
of the two tracts. However, they received no production royalties
as to production from the unit well serving the other tract. Pro-
duction commenced in October of 1957, but no tender of royalties
on the latter unit was made until July 1960. Shortly prior to the
tender of royalties plaintiffs had demanded cancellation of the
lease, and the tendered royalties were thus refused. It appeared
that the royalty due one co-lessor had been fully and timely paid.
It was further apparent that plaintiffs at no time made formal
or informal demand for payment of the royalties due them.
Division orders were mailed to plaintiffs in 1958 and again in
1960 but were neither signed nor returned by them. The court
held that the delay was not only appreciable but was without
justification. The fact that defendant lessee knew royalties were
due plaintiffs seemed "beyond question in view of the fact that
they were paying royalties to ... one of the co-lessors." 51
50. 168 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
51. Id. at 437.
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Under the circumstances, the court of appeal saw no justi-
fication for the delay and granted cancellation of the lease as
to plaintiffs but not as to the co-lessor who had been properly
paid and professed satisfaction with the lease.
The principal difficulty with all of the cases in this area is
that what would ordinarily be a passive breach of contract,
failure to commence payment of production royalties, becomes,
by lapse of time and absence of justification, an active breach
of contract. This striving to characterize the breach as active
is apparently a judicial device to avoid requiring a putting in
default as a prerequisite to cancellation of mineral leases. In a
recent, incisive analysis of the concept of default,5 2 Professor
J. Denson Smith has suggested that the idea of default as a pre-
requisite to suit for resolution of contracts is erroneous. 53 The
author subscribes to this view and to Professor Smith's asser-
tion that a demand for performance should be regarded as
merely one of the circumstances to be considered by a court in
determining the merit of a suit for resolution of a mineral lease
for nonperformance 4 - in this specific context, for failure to
commence payment of production royalties. It does not make
sense to say that a party to a contract must make a demand for
performance when what he desires is not performance but reso-
lution of the contract. In evaluating a demand for resolution,
the nature of the obligation, the manner of breach, the time at
which performance should reasonably have been rendered, the
obligor's knowledge of his default (whether stemming from a
demand by his obligee or some other source), and the obligor's
present willingness to perform, are all among the factors to be
considered in determining whether resolution should be granted.
In effect, the courts seem to be doing what Professor Smith
has suggested, considering all of the circumstances and award-
ing or denying cancellation of mineral leases for nonpayment of
royalties as warranted by the circumstances of each case. But
the judiciary is obviously hampered by the established require-
ment of a demand for performance as a prerequisite to suit for
cancellation of a lease because of a passive breach.55 The device
of changing a passive to an active breach by judicial sleight of
52. Smith, The Cloudy Concept of Default, 12TH INST. ON MINERAL LAW
3 (1965).
53. id. at 9-13.
54. Ibid.
55. E.g., Temple v. Lindsay, 182 La. 22, 161 So. 8 (1935).
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hand allows the courts to do justice as they see it, but it does
not advance the cause of logic and consistency in the law.
Taking the law as it exists, however, it seems that the three
cases discussed above afford some insight into what will be
viewed as "justification" for failure to commence royalties for
an appreciable length of time. The Broadhead decision indicates
that difficulties in obtaining a market or marketing facilities
are proper considerations and that curative work necessary to
clear title and permit accurate payment of royalties constitutes
legitimate cause for delay. Broadhead and Trahan make it ap-
parent that a lessor's failure to render reasonable help or re-
fusal to accept timely tendered payments are also factors which
will be viewed as potential justification. However, it would be
a mistake to assume that the presence of any one of these factors
would, of itself, warrant a lessee's reckless reliance on it as
justification, for each case appears to be considered on a whole
set of circumstances and not a single factor as being definitive.
One other case affecting the general area of royalties was
decided. In Union Prod. Co. v. Browne"6 the lease in question
contained a drilling requirement of a certain number of wells
and a type of minimum royalty provision. Lessee contended
that the minimum royalty clause applied only to the wells con-
templated in the drilling requirement and not to other wells
drilled above the minimum. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peal held, however, that the minimum royalty was applicable
to all wells drilled on the lease.
MINERAL ROYALTIES
The most important decision affecting mineral royalties last
term was rendered in Frey v. Miller5 7 determining that when
production is achieved through a well serving a unit including
part of a royalty tract, prescription is interrupted only as to
that portion of the tract lying within the unit. The author's
opinion of this decision has been fully recorded in last year's
symposium5 8 and in a recent article;59 it would therefore be
56. 165 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
57. 165 So. 2d 43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 167 So. 2d 669.
58. Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term, 25 LA.
L. REV. 291, 377-79 (1965).
59. Hardy, Ruminations on the Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices on




bootless to repeat the prior analysis. Suffice it to say that there
is no adequate basis for distinguishing the case from Montie v.
Sabine Royalty Co.,60 which reached a contrary result, and that
the problems concerning the effect of unitization on mineral ser-
vitudes and royalties are presently fraught with great confusion.
Another important decision was handed down by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal in Lee v. Goodwin." A well was drilled
on land adjoining a royalty tract and was determined to be
capable of producing oil from one sand and gas and condensate
from another. Dual completion was not allowed. However, a
unit for the gas sand was formed to include the entirety of the
royalty tract. As the gas reserves at that time were insufficient
to attract a market, a packer was inserted between the two sands,
and production was achieved through the nonunitized oil sand.
During this period the prescriptive date on the royalty passed,
and the question arose whether it remained in existence. A mar-
ket was obtained and production was ultimately achieved from
the gas unit, but only after the prescriptive date. It appeared
that gas production lasted for a period of only five years and
that production did not repay investment costs for drilling and
building a pipeline to attract a market.
The court found the well to be capable of producing in pay-
ing quantities at the time it was shut in and held in reliance
on LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 62 Union Oil Co. of
California v. Touchet," and Sohio Petroleum Co. v. V.S. &
P.R.R., 4 that the presence of the potentially productive well
on the unit preserved the royalty interest during the interval
between the prescriptive date and actual production. This deci-
sion is in harmony with the author's understanding of the
cases on which the court relied. However, one Justice of the
Supreme Court later disagreed with this interpretation in a dis-
senting opinion to that court's denial of writs.6  The presence
of this opinion leads the author to elaborate on the reasons why
he believes the Second Circuit's decision was correct.
60. 161 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writ8 denied, 246 La. 84, 163
So.2d 359.
61. 174 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), writs denied, 248 La. 149, 177
So. 2d 118.
62. 230 La. 289, 88 So.2d 377 (1956).
63. 229 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956).
64. 222 La. 383, 62 So. 2d 615 (1952).
65. Lee v. Goodwin, 238 La. 139, 177 So. 2d 118 (1965).
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In LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co.6 the royalty tract
was included in a unit on which there was a well capable of
commercial production. The landowner whose interest was bur-
dened by the royalty obligation had granted a lease containing
a shut-in royalty clause, and it appeared that shut-in royalties
were paid. On the facts of the case one might say that the hold-
ing of the court represents the principle that when the landowner
grants a lease with a shut-in royalty clause and such royalties
are paid, there is constructive production and prescription on
the royalty interest is therefore interrupted. This is, in fact,
the construction given that decision by the dissent to the denial
of writs in Lee v. Goodwin.67 It was, indeed, an argument made
by counsel for the royalty owner and repeated in the Supreme
Court's opinion in LeBlanc. However, the rule stated by the
court in deciding the LeBlanc case makes no mention of the
presence of the shut-in royalty clause as a basis for the opin-
ion, and there are demonstrable reasons why it is undesirable
to key the effect on prescription to the lease executed by the
landowner or servitude owner whose interest is burdened by a
royalty.
The rule ultimately stated by the Supreme Court is found
in the following quotation:
"The well . . . was capable of producing gas and gas con-
densate in paying quantities, and was on land included with-
in the unit which was formed within ten years from the date
of the royalty sale; consequently, the defendant was entitled
to 1/64th royalty. The fact that the well was shut in for
want of a market and that no gas was sold from it until
after expiration of ten years from the date of the royalty
sale cannot defeat the rights of defendant to share in pro-
duction, once begun."""
The rule was even more clearly stated in Delatte v. Woods,69
which relied on Touchet and LeBlanc:
"The completion and the existence of a shut-in gas well on
a validly created unit are equivalent to production on all
tracts in order to interrupt the prescription accruing against
66. 230 La. 289, 88 So. 2d 377 (1956).
67. 238 La. 139, 177 So. 2d 118 (1965).
68. LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 230 La. 299, 309, 88 So. 2d 377,
380 (1956).
69. 232 LA. 841, 94 So. 2d 281 (1957).
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royalty interests and preserve same from extinction by pre-
scription. '70
The Touchet case enunciates the principle in similar fashion.7 1
In the Sohio case the court relied on R.S. 30:9B, providing that
a unit will constitute "a developed area as long as a well is
located thereon which is capable of producing oil or gas in pay-
ing quantities," to preserve a mineral lease. Thus, it appears
that the concept of the conservation statute has influenced the
court to hold that presence of a shut-in well capable of produc-
ing in paying quantities will preserve a royalty interest until
production is achieved. Why should this result be reached, and
what is the technical effect of the presence of the shut-in well?
To begin with, one can envision that the presence of a com-
mercial well during the last days of existence of a royalty inter-
est might tempt a land or mineral owner to collude with his
lessee to shut a well in for a sufficient period to allow the out-
standing royalty to lapse. Opportunities for such back-scratch-
ing should be minimized. Further, it does not appear wise to
pin rules of property to the kind of lease contract executed by
the land or mineral owner whose interest is burdened by a roy-
alty. Suppose that instead of a typical north Louisiana form
the landowner in the instant case had executed a standard south
Louisiana form providing that shutting in of a well capable of
producing gas or gaseous substances in paying quantities shall
be the same as termination of operations in a dry hole, thus per-
mitting commencement or resumption of rental payments rather
than providing for payments contractually equated to royalties.
Would the result of the cases involving royalties be changed be-
cause the landowner has not executed a lease with a shut-in
"royalty" clause? It seems unwise to vest the landowner with
power to alter the rights of the royalty owner by such unilateral
action.
For these reasons, the author feels that the court of appeal
has correctly interpreted the prior jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court and that this interpretation should be adhered to in deal-
ing with future cases involving similar facts. The Supreme
Court gave some evidence of approving the interpretations, as in
70. Id. at 358, 94 So. 2d at 287.




denying writs it stated that on the facts as found by the appel-
late court there was no error of law.72
Two other facets of the decision bear elaboration. First,
what is the technical nature of the effect on prescription? Is it
a suspension or an interruption? It seems somewhat illogical to
term the effect an interruption as the condition interrupting
prescription, production in which the royalty owner is entitled
to share, has not occurred. Yet the Supreme Court in Delatte v.
Woods7 3 equates presence of the well to production and desig-
nates the effect as an interruption of prescription. Possibly this
aspect of the decision should be viewed as dictum, since a dis-
tinction between interruption and suspension was unnecessary
to the case. To the author it seems that the presence of the
shut-in well judged capable of producing in paying quantities
at a time prior to the prescriptive date should be regarded
as suspending the running of prescription until production is
achieved. This gives rise to the question of how long the sus-
pension should be deemed to last. The answer is indefinite but
it is the only one which can logically be given: as long as the
well continues to classify as one capable of producing in paying
quantities. If at any time circumstances change and the well no
longer meets the required standard, the suspension should cease
and prescription should commence to run as before. Of course,
if the courts should clearly hold the effect to be an interrup-
tion, presence of the well would, presumably, constitute a con-
tinuing interruption as long as the well remains capable of pro-
ducing in paying quantities.
It should be emphasized that the requirement regarding the
well is that it be capable of producing in paying quantities. This
consideration presents the second additional item for discussion.
One might infer from the opinion of the Second Circuit in the
Goodwin case that it was judging the effect of the shut-in well
on prescription by the subsequent actual performance of the
well as a producer in paying quantities. This seems inaccurate.
As suggested, the time to determine whether prescription is sus-
pended (or interrupted if that is not a correct characterization
of the effect) is the date it was tested and shut in as a well
capable of producing in paying quantities. This determination
should be made on the basis of test data accumulated at a time
72. Lee v. Goodwin, 238 La. 149, 177 So. 2d 118 (1965).
73. 232 La. 341, 94 So. 2d 281 (1957).
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prior to the prescriptive date. It should not matter that by hind-
sight the reasonable determination of the productivity of the
well based on adequate test data proves to be erroneous.
One might further infer from the opinion on original hear-
ing that the court felt that production interrupting prescription
accruing against a mineral royalty must necessarily be in "pay-
ing quantities." This impression was carefully corrected by a
per curiam opinion subsequent to application for rehearing.7 4
The court stated that production interrupting prescription need
only be production in which the royalty owner is entitled to
share. Whether it is in "paying quantities" as that expression is
understood for purposes of lease administration should be of no
moment. The writer hastens to agree. If the royalty owner par-
ticipates in production, either in kind or by payment of any
amount of royalties, this fact alone should fulfill the require-
ment of production to interrupt prescription. The right to par-
ticipate in production is what is conveyed or reserved in a roy-
alty transaction, and participation in production, regardless of
quantity, should preserve the royalty right. This, as observed by
the court, is consonant with a prior ruling of the Supreme Court
regarding preservation of a mineral servitude by production.75




Guarisco v. J. C. Trahan, Inc.7T is a decision which appears
to have reached an acceptable result by somewhat questionable
means. Plaintiffs sought an order requiring defendant to make
a directional survey of an oil well completed and operated by
the defendant. It was alleged that the well permit was orig-
inally issued to another operator, that defendant had taken over
and completed the well under an amended drilling permit, and
that no directional survey was made as required by section
XVIII of Statewide Order 29-B of the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion despite the fact that the well had a surface location less than
300 feet from the property line of a portion of ground owned
by plaintiffs and was drilled to a depth greater than 4000 feet.
74. Lee v. Goodwin, 174 So. 2d 651, 655 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
75. Mays v. Hansbro, 222 La. 957, 64 So. 2d 232 (1953).
76. 173 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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Plaintiffs further alleged that the Commissioner of Conservation
had failed to bring suit to restrain the defendant from continu-
ing to violate the provisions of the order in accordance with
R.S. 30:1477 and that plaintiffs were availing themselves of the
right granted by R.S. 30:1678 to bring suit to prevent further
violation.
The cited provision of Statewide Order 29-B states that wells
having a surface location 300 feet more or less from any prop-
erty line or unit line and which reach a depth of 4000 feet or
more shall have directional surveys made to the total depth of
the hole before setting final string of casing. R.S. 30:14 pro-
vides that whenever it appears that a person is violating a con-
servation order, the Commissioner shall bring suit to restrain
that person from continuing the violation. R.S. 30:16 provides
that any person in interest adversely affected by the violation
who has notified the Commissioner in writing of the violation
and requested him to sue may bring suit to prevent further
violation.
Defendant filed an exception of no right of action and a
motion for summary judgment. Judgment was rendered in favor
of defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. The First Circuit Court
of Appeal sustained the judgment of the lower court. From
reading the appellate opinion, it appears that the court disposed
of the case by sustaining an exception of no right of action. To
the author this seems erroneous. The exception of no right of
action is intended to question the interest of the plaintiff in the
subject matter of the suit. 9 That this plaintiff, alleging that the
well in question was bottomed under his land, had an interest
in the subject matter appears beyond question. However, dis-
77. Insofar as it is pertinent to this discussion LA. R.S. 30:14 (1950) pro-
vides : .. Whenever it appears that a person is violating or is threatening to vio-
late a law of this state with respect to the conservation of oil or gas, or both, or
provision of this Chapter, or a rule, regulation, or order made thereunder, the
commissioner shall bring suit to restrain that person from continuing the violation
or from carrying out the threat."
78. LA. R.S. 30:16 (1950) : "If the Commissioner fails to bring suit within
ten days to restrain a violation as provided in R.S. 30:14, any person in interest
adversely affected by the violation who has notified the Commissioner in writing
of the violation or threat thereof and has requested the Commisisoner to sue, may
bring suit to prevent any or further violations, in a district court of any parish
in which the Commissioner could have brought suit. If the Court holds that in-
junctive relief should be granted, the Commissioner shall be made a party and
shall be substituted for the person who brought the suit and the injunction shall
be issued as if the Commissioner had at all times been the complaining party."




position of the case on the basis of the motion for summary
judgment, though arguable, is certainly a supportable means for
decision.
Defendant took over the well at a depth of 13,100 feet. A
dipmeter survey had been conducted to that depth, but no direc-
tional survey had been made, and there was apparently no means
of even approximating the direction in which the hole might
have drifted below the depth of 13,100 feet. Plaintiffs made
a demand upon the Commissioner of Conservation to have a
directional survey conducted. In response, the Commissioner
replied that on the basis of approximate computations which
could be made from the dipmeter survey to the depth of 13,100
feet the hole at that depth was drifting away from plaintiff's
property. Assuming a complete reversal of direction and a ver-
tical deviation of 30, the Commissioner eliminated any possibil-
ity that the well could be bottomed under plaintiffs' premises.
Defendant apparently argued that the letter to plaintiffs
constituted a ruling by the Commissioner that the evidence
available to the Commissioner concerning the deviation of the
hole and its approximate bottom eliminated the necessity for
any directional survey. Among the exhibits submitted by de-
fendant there was an opinion from counsel to the Commissioner
advising that the Commissioner had discretionary authority to
order the survey. It was urged, therefore, that plaintiffs' prop-
er remedy was to attack this "ruling" of the Commissioner
directly under R.S. 30:12.80 This argument was apparently ap-
pealing to the courts.
If the holding of this case is correctly analyzed as being that
the letter from the Commissioner to plaintiffs constituted a rul-
ing which should have been attacked directly, the decision is
supportable. In effect, it seems that the court is saying that the
Commissioner's letter is an adjudication on the applicability of
the provision of Statewide Order 29-B requiring directional sur-
veys. The adjudication was that within the meaning and intent
of the order no survey was required in this particular case.
60. insofar as it is pertinent to this discussion, LA. R.S. 30:12 (1950) pro-
vides: "An interested person adversely affected by any law of this state with
respect to conservation of oil or gas, or both, or by provision of this Chapter, oi?
,by rule, regulation, or order made by the Commissioner hereunder, or by an act
done or threatened thereunder, and who has exhausted his administrative remedy,




Thus, because the order was ruled inapplicable, plaintiffs could
not maintain their assertion that the Commissioner was failing
to prevent a violation of the order and that they were right-
fully suing to enjoin further violation.
This is certainly a logical analysis of the situation. The only
questions which arise in the author's mind are how one exhausts
administrative remedies in this type of case and whether, in
view of the informality of the "ruling," there would be an ade-
quate record on which to base a judicial review. Presumably,
if an attack on the order were made, the record would consist
of the plaintiff's demand that Order 29-B be applied, the Com-
missioner's reply, and the dipmeter survey on which the Com-
missioner relied as a basis for his calculations concerning the
location of the bottom of the hole. It does not appear that there
had been any opportunity to present evidence conflicting with
the Commissioner's conclusions, and therefore it is at least argu-
able that there is not a sufficient record to permit judicial
review.
Nevertheless, the holding of the case is, on the facts, de-
fensible. Perhaps the lesson to be learned for those caught in
plaintiffs' position in the future is that when any similar de-
mand is made for the application of a statewide order or other
rule or regulation or any request is made for a declaratory
ruling by the Commissioner as to the applicability of a rule,
order, or regulation, the party should be prepared to submit
some form of evidence in support of his position along with
the demand or request to assure that the maximum amount of
information will be before a court in the event judicial review
becomes desirable or necessary.
Well Costs
Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.8 1 is certainly
one of the most important decisions rendered during the past
term. The case determines that a lessee provoking a unitization
hearing and seeking to participate in a proposed unit can be
forced by the operator of the well to pay a proportionate share
of drilling costs in cash. The holding indicates that the remedy
of withholding production to recoup drilling costs is not an ex-
clusive remedy under the circumstances of the case. The court
81. 165 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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carefully limited its holding to the situation of a nondrilling
"owner"8 2 or lessee who demands unitization.
Two possible theories for this decision emerge from the opin-
ion. One is that R.S. 30:10A(1) (c),8 3 by referring to costs of
development and operation as being chargeable against other
"owners"84 in a conservation unit, impliedly grants to the unit
operator the right to recover. The other is a theory of unjust
enrichment advanced in a per curiam opinion on application for
rehearing.
R.S. 30:10A (1) (c) states that development and operating
costs chargeable by the operator to other owners are limited to
actual reasonable expenditures, including supervision, and in the
event of dispute are to be fixed by the Commissioner of Conser-
vation. There is no mention of how such costs are to be recov-
ered, and there is no categorical statement that they are recover-
able. However, it does not make good sense to refer to costs
as being chargeable by an operator without at least implying
that when charged they may be collected by some adequate
means in the event of refusal to pay. Thus, it appears sound
to infer that some right of recovery is implied in the statute.
In Hunter Co. v. McHugh85 the unit operator was recovering
drilling and operating costs by withholding production from
other owners. This procedure was attacked on the ground that
the conservation statute grants no independent right to recover
such costs. The position of the operator was, however, upheld.
It was thought by many and, indeed, was strongly urged in the
case under discussion that withholding production was the only
means by which the operator might recover costs.
82. The court does not indicate whether it used the term "owner" in the tech-
nical sense of R.S. 30:3(8) - i.e. "the person who has the right to drill into and
to produce from a pool and to appropriate the production either for himself or for
others." However, since it used the phrase "owner or lessee" it seems likely that
it was referring to owners of unleased interests (who would classify as "owners"
under the statute) and lessees (who would also be "owners" within the statute).
83. LA. R.S. 30:10A(1) (c) (1950) : "In the event pooling is required, the
cost of development and operation of the pooled unit chargeable by the operator
to the other interested owners shall be limited to the actual reasonable expenditures
required for that purpose, including a charge for supervision. In the event of a
dispute relative to these costs, the commissioner shall determine the proper costs,
after notice to all interested persons and a hearing."
84. The term "owner" is here used in the technical sense intended by R.S.
30:3(8). For a quotation of that definition see note 82 supra.
85. 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495 (1942).
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It seems reasonable enough to limit the operator to with-
holding production if the party owing costs is a nonconsenting
participant in a unit. This means that the business judgment
of the operator in drilling and operating the unit cannot be sub-
stituted for that of a party who has not consented at the lat-
ter's cost, except to the extent of his share of production. How-
ever, there are strong equities favoring the position of plain-
tiff in the Superior case. Plaintiff had allegedly incurred drill-
ing costs of some $300,000. As a result of the unitization pro-
voked by defendant, plaintiff saw more than 55% of the total
production taken from it. The economic burden of having to
pay out the total investment from less than half of the produc-
tion, freeing the share of the party requesting the unit from
any burden whatsoever, was simply one which the court was not
willing to impose.
The meaning of the decision seems fairly clear. If an "own-
er," as defined by the conservation act, provokes a unitization
and is not the operator of the unit well, the right of withholding
that party's share of production as a means of recovering drill-
ing and operating costs is not the only remedy available to the
unit operator. Limiting the right of recovery in cash to those
who seek to become part of the enterprise represented by the
unit assures that nonconsenting parties will not become open
game for those wishing to provoke unitization as a means of
spreading their business risk under cover of compulsory process
of law.
The Superior decision has been criticized,8 6 but to the author
it appears sound to say that withholding of production is not
an exclusive remedy. Admittedly, there are unsolved problems
as to the further situations in which this decision may be fol-
lowed or distinguished, such as that of Lessee A provoking a
hearing to unitize with a portion of Lessee B's property prior to
drilling; this raises the possibility of what A's liability would
be if B drills the unit well and it turns out to be a dry hole. Yet,
it seems that if administered with proper consideration of each
type of case, the remedy established as a result of the Superior
case can serve a beneficial purpose in the law.
86. MeCollam, Recent Jurisprudence-], TWELFTR INST. ON MINERAL LAw
105, 117 (1965).
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